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CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT IN CONVEYANCES
IN MISSOURI
1.

Importance Of The Topic.

Though the learning surrounding the subject of conditions
has lost some of its importance because of the infrequency with
which conditions are now enforced by entry for breach,' it has
by no means become obsolete in the modern, law of conveyancing.
Cases still arise to which the common law rules are applicable,
as instanced in three recent Missouri decisions, 2 and the strictness of those rules, due to the disfavor with which the law regards
conditions, seems to justify this special study of the Missouri
decisions relating to the subject.
2.

Implied Conditions.

At common law, as a consequence of tenure, every estate
was held subject to certain implied conditions, called conditions
in law. 3 These conditions in law were invented for the protection of lords against their tenants and for the punishment of
the latter in the event of a denial of a lord's paramount title.
Thus, a tenant for life held his estate on condition that he should
not attempt to alien to a stranger in fee. 4 Even where tenure is
conceived to be still in existence, 5 implied conditions are now
1. "In England, for nearly, if not quite, two centuries, the remedy
by entry for breach of condition attached to a conveyance in fee simple
has been practically obsolete." Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 282,
note. See Sugden, Powers (8th ed.) 106. A mortgage is nothing more
or less than a conveyance on condition. See Kales, Future Interests
in Illinois, § 17, et seq. But the limits of this study do not permit
an analysis of our mortgage law on this basis.
2. Bredell v. Westminster College (1912) 242 Mo. 317; K. C. etc.
Ry. Co. v. Young (1912) 167 Mo. App. 524; Smith v. Eagle Coal &.
Mercantile Co. (1913) 170 Mo. App. 27. See also Lackland v. Walker
(Mo., 1914) 169 S. W. 275.
3. Co. Litt. 215a, 233b; Tiffany, Real Property, § 67.
4. Archer's Case (1597) 1 Co. 66b; Reeves, Real Property, § 713.
5. For a discussion of the question whether tenure still exists
in the United States, see Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.). §§ 22 and 23.
The writer has found no reference to this question in the Missouri
reports.
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important only in leases. According to many American decisions,6 terms for years are still held subject to an implied condition that the tenant will not disclaim his landlord's title. The
term, implied condition, may also be used to embrace statutory
7
conditions which will be separately treated in this study.
3.

Express Conditions.

Any interest in land or chattels may be conveyed or transferred conditionally. The condition need not be expressed in
writing except where the statute of frauds requires a writing
for the conveyance or transfer. 8 In determining whether a condition exists, the intention of the parties must govern, 9 and an
intention that a condition shall postpone the vesting or occasion
the divesting of an estate must be clearly expressed.' 0 In the
early law, much stress was laid on the particular words with
which the condition was introduced, 1 there being greater liberality in construing leases for years. But more recently any words
which clearly indicate the necessary intention will suffice.' 2 The
artistic and proper words for a condition are "provided," "so
as," and "on condition." 18 In Adams v. Lindell,14 the condition
was introduced by the words "so long as," but these words
ordinarily denote the limitation or duration of the estate.' 5
But conditions are regarded with such exceeding disfavor
that wherever possible it will be found that no condition was
intended. The effect of the aptest words of condition may be
overcome by other expressions or by the effect of the instru6. Tiffany, Real Property, § 52.
7. Vide post, p. 27.
8. In Halbert v. Halbert (1855) 21 Mo. 277, a slave was transferred on a condition expressed orally. A lease may be assigned on
condition. Doe d. Freeman v. Bateman (1818) 2 B. & Ald. 168.
9. St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co. (1886) 88 Mo. 612; Mott v.
Morris (1912.) 249 Mo. 137.
10. Morrill v. Wabash Ry. (1888)
nolds (1910) 234 Mo. 144.

11. Litt., §§ 328-31.
(Mass.)
12.

96 Mo. 174; Reynolds v. Rey-

See Rawson v. School District (1863) 7 Allen

125.
Tiffany, Real Property, § 68.

13.

Stilwell v. St. Louis & Hannibal Ry. Co. (1889)

14.
15.

(1878) 5 Mo. App. 197, 72 Mo. 198.
Reeves,, Real Property, § 711.

221.

39 Mo. App.
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ment judged as a whole. In Stilwell v. St. Louis & Hannibal
Ry. Co.,1 6 the court expressed the opinion that the words "on
condition," or words of like import, were not sufficient within
themselves to create a condition. But in numerous cases, they
have been given that effect. 1 7 The tendency is to treat stipulations as covenants, 18 or trusts,1 9 instead of conditions. Where
the conveyance is expressly made for a certain purpose, the
fulfillment of the purpose is not a condition subsequent unless
clearly so intended. 20 Where the conveyance is made in "consideration" of something to be done by the grantee, the doing
of the act is not a condition subsequent even though there is no
other consideration for the conveyance, 2' unless clearly so intended.2 2 A total failure of consideration does not occasion a
forfeiture of the estate conveyed. 23 But conditions may be ex24
pressed inartistically as "consideration" for the conveyance.
It would seem entirely, proper to consider whether a valuable
consideration has passed for the conveyance, in determining
16.

dissent.

(1889) 39 Mo. App. 221.

In this case there was a strong

17. Weinreich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364.
18. Roanoke Investment Co. v. K. C. & S. E. Ry. Co. (1891) 108
Mo. 50; Studdard v. Wells (1894) 120 Mo. 25; Anderson v. Gaines
(1900) 156 Mo. 664; Gratz v. Highland Scenic R. R. Co. (1901) 165
Mo. 211.
19. In Weinreich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364, the court
seems to have thought there was both a condition and a trust. In
Kennett v. Plummer (1859) 28 Mo. 142, the court refused to decide
whether the grant was on condition or in trust. In Hoke v. Central
Township Farmers' Club (1905) 194 Mo. 576, the condition was stated
as one of the terms of a "trust."
20. Hand v. St. Louis '(1900) 158 Mo. 204; Mott v. Morris (1912)
249 Mo. 137. In Stilwell v. St. Louis & Hannibal Ry. Co. (1889) 39
Mo. App. 221, the court said, "The nonfulfliment of the purposes for
which a conveyance by deed is made will not of itself defeat an estate."
See Rawson v. School District (1863) 7 Allen (Mass.) 125. In this
connection, Mullanphy v. Peterson (1827) 1 Mo. 758, is a bit of legal
curiosity.
21. Studdard v. Wells (1893) 120 Mo. 25, was probably such a
conveyance, though a money consideration was expressed. See also
McAnaw v. Tiffln (1898) 143 Mo. 667; Gratz v. Highland Scenic R. R.
Co. (1901) 165 Mo. 211.
22. Laberee v. Carleton (1865) 53 Me. 211.
23. Cf. Hubbard v. K. C. etc. R. R. Co. (1876) 63 Mo. 68.
24. Helton v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. (1887) 25 Mo. App. 322;
Wood v. Ogden (1906) 121 Mo. App. 628. But cf. Stilwell v. St. Louis
& Hannibal Ry. Co. (1889) 39 Mo. App. 221.
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whether it shall be construed to be on condition, 2 5 and courts
should be more strict where such a consideration exists. But
apparently this consideration has had little weight in the Missouri decisions.203 On this principle, words in a will may be
given the effect of creating a condition which would not be so
construed if contained in a deed given for consideration.
A provision for the forfeiture of an estate on the happening
of some event or the doing of some act is strong evidence that
a conveyance on condition was intended. But a right of reentry, as the creator's right to terminate an estate is usually
called, need not be expressly reserved.2 7 As stated in Brooks v.
Gafin,28 "such a right is a necessary incident of the condition,
and if the condition is broken the right of possession immediately
arises." In Roberts v. Crume 29 and Haydon v. St. Louis, etc.
R. R. Co.,30 the absence of such a provision seems to have
weighed with the court in its conclusion that no condition was
intended. But in numerous cases, conditions have been found
to exist where no right of re-entry was reserved. 31 Conversely,
25.
§ 68.
26.

Ecroyd v. Coggeshall (1898) 21 R. I. 1; Tiffany, Real Property,
In Roberts v. Crume (1902)

173 Mo. 572, the court went to

the limit in holding that the devise was not subject to a conditional
limitation. In McRoberts v. Moudy (1885) 19 Mo. App. 26, the court
said that "the doctrine of reversion applies only to the instance of
a donation for a charity, and not to that of a vendor or grantor of
land in fee for a valuable consideration paid." This is probably a
statement of the obsolete notion that on the dissolution of a corporation its lands revert to the donor. Morrill v. Wabash Ry. (1888) 96
Mo. 174. See Gray, Perpetulties (2d ed.) §§ 48-51a; Kales, Future
Interests in Illinois, § 126; Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) 467. In
Wood v. Kice (1890) 103 Mo. 329, the court said, "A donor has the
right to impress upon his gift such conditions as he sees fit; but when
one buys and pays for property it is his in equity even before he gets
a deed for it and the grantor's right to fetter its alienation is more
limited, than in the other case, if allowed at all." Clearly a grantor
has no right to annex any conditions unless they were stipulated
for in the contract for the conveyance.
27. Stilwell v. St. Louis & Hannibal Ry. Co. (1889) 39 Mo. App.
221, But cf. Knoepker v. Redel (1905) 116 Mo. 62.
28. (1905) 192 Mo. 228, 251.
29. (1902) 173 Mo. 572. This was really a case of conditional
limitation.
30. (1909) 222 Mo. 126.
.31. Hubbard v. K. C. etc. R. R. (1876) 63 Mo. 68; McClellan v.
St. Louis & Hannibal R. R. Co. (1890) 103 Mo. 295.
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conditions have been found to exist where no apt words of condition were present, but a provision that the conveyance should
be void on the happening of an event.3 2
4.

Construction Of Conditions.

Since the law favors the vesting of estates, conditions will
be construed, where possible, as subsequent rather than precedent,
as providing for the divesting of the estate instead of postponing its vesting. 33 It would seem that where the condition involves a consideration for the conveyance, the disposition should
be to call it precedent. If, on the other hand, the condition involves the doing of some act on the land,3 4 or of some act which
can be done more easily if the grantee possesses the land, the
disposition should be to call it subsequent. Such is a condition
that the grantee support the grantor or some one else.35 In
Wood v. Ogden,,36 a devise "upon consideration" that the devisee
support and maintain the testator's widow, was held to be on,
condition subsequent.3 7 If precedent, the condition will be construed strictly in favor of the estate's vesting; if subsequent, it
will be construed strictly against its being divested.38
Conditions subsequent must be sharply distinguished from
special limitations and conditional limitations. A grant to A and
his heirs provided that if A should enter the clergy the grantor
may re-enter, is a grant on condition subsequent. But a grant
to A and his heirs so long as he or they shall not enter the clergy,
is a grant subject to a special limitation. In the latter case A
has a determinable, sometimes called a base or qualified fee,
32. Knight v. K. C. etc. R. R. Co. (1879) 70 Mo. 231. The right
to declare a forfeiture expressly reserved in a lease is equivalent to
a reservation of the right to re-enter. Geer v. Zinc Co. (1907) 126
Mo. App. 173.
33. Weinreich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364; Jones v.
Jones (1909) 223 Mo. 424. See 2 Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) 1475.
34. As in Jones v. Jones (1909) 223 Mo. 424.

35. Alexander v. Alexander (1900)

150 Mo. 413.

(1906) 121 Mo. App. 668.
Moore v. Wingate (1873) 53 Mo. 398. But cf. Studdard v.
Wells (1893) 120 Mo. 25.
38. As instanced in Goode v. St. Louis (1892) 113 Mo. 2,57.
36.
37.
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and the grantor has a possibility of reverter.39 Both are in a
sense grants on condition-in the first, the grantor has a contingent right of re-entry, an exercise of which will have the
effect of substituting the grantor for the grantee in the estate;
in the second, the grantor by reason of his possibility of reverter
may come into possession of what he had before the grant which
has been determined. 40 The essential difference is that the estate
on condition will become voidable, not void, when A enters the
clergy, whereas the determinable fee will end entirely when A
or his heirs enter the clergy, "by the intrinsic force of the limitation." 41 Possibilities of reverter may have been abolished by
Quia Emptores,42 but there is no Missouri decision to this effect.
The question has lost much of its importance since it is possible
for the special limitation to give rise to a resulting use in the
grantor under the statute of uses, 43 but it may still arise in con44
nection with the rule against perpetuities.
Grants on conditions and grants subject to special limitations
were both possible at common law. Neither the right of entry 45
nor a possibility of reverter could be reserved to a stranger. But
with the introduction of shifting interests by the statute of uses,
it became possible by a conditional limitation to cut short one
estate in order to create another. 46 Thus, a conveyance by way
of use to A. and his heirs forever, but if the University of Missouri should be moved from Columbia during A's life or within
twenty-one years thereafter, then to B and his heirs. A takes
a fee simple subject to a conditional limitation., sometimes erro39.

Challis, Real Property (3d ed.)

82; Tiffany, Real Property,

§ 116; Reeves, Real Property, § 711 et seq. See Roanoke Investment
Co. v. K. C. & S. E. Ry. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 50.
40. Leake, Property in Land (2d ed.) 162; Gray, Perpetuities
(2d ed.) § 31 et seq.
41.

Adams v. Lindell (1878)

5 Mo. App. 197, 72. Mo. 198; Hoselton

v. Hoselton (1901) 166 Mo. 182, semble; Henderson v. Hunter (1868)
59 Pa. St. 335. See also Dumey v. Schoeffler (1857) 24 Mo. 170.
42. Professor Gray expresses this view. Perpetuities (2d ed.)
§ 31 et seq. See also, Kales, Future Interests In Illinois, § 124 et seq.
The statute Quia Emptores was made a part of Missouri law in 1816.
1 Mo. Terr. Laws, p. 436.
43.

Pollard v. Union National Bank (1877)

4 Mo. App. 408.

44. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) §§ 41, 774 et seq.
45. Knight v. K. C. etc. R. R. Co. (1879) 70 Mo. 231.
46. See Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 22, note.
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neously called a determinable fee; B has a valid shifting interest, 4 T which would have been bad at common law before the
statute of uses as an attempt to limit a fee on a fee.
The distinction between a condition and a conditional limitation was neglected by the Missouri court in Witherspoon v.
Brokaw,4 8 and in Roberts v. Crume,49 but it was very 'properly
stated in Hoselton v. Hoselton.50
5.

Validity Of Conditions.

In general, it is possible for one who is conveying property
to annex any condition he may desire. 51 It must always be
stated sufficiently clearly to enable a court to determine what
the condition is, and when the event has happened. In Jones v.
Jones,52 the testator devised lands to his son provided he should
be capable after an expiration of twenty years "of a prudent
exercise, control and ownership of said real estate, and that no
further danger shall exist or be apprehended on account of"
his spendthrift tendencies. The court held that since no one
was designated to determine these questions, the condition subsequent was too indefinite and uncertain and therefore void.
Conditions must also conform to the policy of the law. A
condition in total restraint of marriage is void,53 but a reasonable
restraint on marriage, such as re-marriage by, a widow, 54 or mar47. If created by will, it would be a valid executory devise. See
Kales, Future Interests In Illinois, § 125. Some doubt may have been
cast on the possibility of creating such interests in Missouri by the
decision of Simmons v. Cabanne (1903) 177 Mo. 336. See Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 68a, note. But it has been dispelled by the later
decisions. Sullivan v. Garesche (1910) 229 Mo. 496.
48. (1900) 85 Mo. App. 169.
49. (1902) 173 Mo. 572.
50. (1901) 166 Mo. 182.'
51. Baker v. C. R. . & P. R. R. Co. (1874) 57 Mo. 265. In Gratz
v. Highland Scenic R. R. Co. (1901) 165 Mo. 211, the court said that
"one of the requirements of the law is that a condition carrying
forfeiture must be reasonable."
52. (1909) 223 Mo. 424.
53. Williams v. Cowden (1850) 13 Mo. 211; Knost v. Knost (1910)
229 Mo. 170.
54. Walsh v. Matthews (1847) 11 Mo. 131; Dumey v. Schoefl1er
(1857) 24 Mo. 170. The statutory estate of homestead is conditioned
on the widow's re-marriage. Chrisman v. Linderman (1906) 202 Mo.
605. The question of the validity of a restraint on a widower's re-
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riage to a certain person, 55 or into a certain sect 56 or race, 7
is valid. 58 Here it is important to distinguish between a condition restraining marriage and a limitation until the grantee marries-the latter will be construed as a provision for support,
wherever possible, and therefore valid. 59 A condition against
the grantee's enjoying the premises granted in any way is void
for repugnancy. 60 A condition against alienation in any way,
attached to a fee simple, is void because of the public interest
in the alienability of all lands, 6 1 but such a condition annexed
to a life estate or a term for years is good. A condition that a
fee simple shall not be aliened to particular persons is good. If
a condition involves the neglect of some legal duty, or the performance of some illegal act, it is void. Such is a condition
against a wife's living with her husband, or against a child's living
with its father. In Witherspoon v. Brokaw,62 the testator devised property to his niece "so long as she may live separate
and apart from her husband" and upon her reunion with him to
marriage does not seem to have arisen in Missouri.

The dictum irn
Knost v. Knost (1910) 229 Mo. 170, 178, would not allow such restraint.
It would seem that re-marriage by a widower and by a widow should
be restrainable on the same terms, though the widow by re-marrying
gains a right to support whereas the widower does not. The decisions have generally drawn no distinction. Waters v. Tazewell (1856)
9 Md. 291, cited by the Missouri court in Knost v. Knost, is no authority for such a distinction since the Maryland court's decision of
Bostick v. Blades (1882) 59 Md. 231. See also Allen v. Jackson (1875)
1 Ch. Div. 399.
55. Graydon v. G'raydon (1872) 23 N. J. Eq. 229.
56. In re Knox (1889) 23 L. R. Ir. 542..
57. Hodgson v. Hallord (1879) 11 Ch. Div. 959.
58. On the general subject of conditions in restraint of marriage,
see the valuable note in Gray's Cases on Property (2d ed.) Vol. VI,
p. 31.
59. Jones v. Jones (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 279; Mann v. Jackson (1892)
84 Me. 400. It would be more difficult to find that a provision for
support was intended where the grantee or devisee Is a man.
60. Smith v. Clark (1856) 10 Md. 186. Cf. McDowell v. Brown
(1855) 21 Mo. 57.
61. McDowell v. Brown (1855) 21 Mo. 57. Forfeitures for alienation, by conditions or conditional limitations, should be carefully distinguished from restraints on alienation. The subject of restraints
on alienation cannot be adequately treated within the limits of this
study. For a discussion of the Missouri cases, see Gray, Restraints
on Alienation (2d ed.) § 240 et seq.
62. (1900) 85 Mo. App. 169. In Newkerk v. Newkerk (1805) 2
Caines (N. Y.) 345, a condition requiring the devisee to live in a
particular town was held void as being capricious.
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his son; and other property to the niece's daughter "so long as
she shall be kept from the control and custody of her father," and
to his son thereafter. Both conditional limitations were held to
be void. The court distinguished between a provision the object
of which is to prevent a resumption of the marriage relation,
and one the object of which is merely to provide for a wife
during her misfortune.
Rights of entry for conditions broken seem to be "within
both the letter and the spirit of the rule against perpetuities," 63
and in England they are held to be subject to the rule.

4

But,

in America, they have been exempted from the application of
the rule.65 The question has not been decided by the Missouri
court.00 In Clarke v. Inhabitants of Brookfield,67 the court adverted to a five-year condition as being unobjectionable "on the
ground of any possible remoteness in the time limited for its
fulfillment." In numerous cases 68 where no time limit was set
for the breach, it has been assumed that the conditions were
valid, and it is probably too late to raise objection to the possible remoteness of a right of re-entry.
6. Enforcement of Conditions.
It has long been common to speak of a deed as a contract,69
but the modern tendency is to restrict the use of the word contract to transactions out of which promissory obligations arise.
The execution and delivery of a deed and its acceptance by the
grantee do not necessarily make a contract.70 Deeds are usually
63. Gray, Perpetuities (2d ed.) § 299 et seq.
64. In re Hollis Hospital (1899) 2 Ch. 540.
65. French v. Old South Society (1871) 106 Mass. 479; Tiffany,
Real Property, § 155.

66.
67.

3 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 18.
(1884) 81 Mo. 303.

68.

Adams v. Lindell (1880)

5 Mo. App. 197, 72 Mo. 198; Wein-

reich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364; Brooks v. Gaffin (1905) 192

Mo. 229; Hoke v. Central Township Farmers' Club (1905) 194 Mo.
576; Bredell v. Westminster College (1912) 242 Mo. 316.
69. Henderson v. Hunter (1868) 59 Pa. St. 335.
70. But a lessee who accepts a lease which reserves rent becomes
liable for the rent. So if a grantee accepts a deed which recites his
assumption of a mortgage debt, he is liable for the debt. Heim v.
Togel (1879) 69 Mo. 529. But this may be on an implied promise
for the benefit of a third person. Fitzgerald v. Barker (1879) 70 Mo.
685, Cf. Weinreich v. Weinreich (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364.
2
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given as the result of a contract for a conveyance, but where
only the grantor signs, there can be only a unilateral undertaking
and this is contractual in the proper sense only when it is promissory, as where the grantor covenants. 7 1 The grantee, by his
acceptance, need do no more than give his assent to taking the
title.
The foregoing analysis shows that a grantee's acceptance of
an estate on condition does not necessarily obligate him to perform the condition, although a consequence of his failure to perform it may be his losing the estate conveyed. Conditions are
frequently framed as provisions for forfeiture on breach of
covenant,7 2 and in such cases have their foundation in the contract. But an action on the covenant may be maintained after
73
the condition, is waived.
In several Missouri cases, there have been dicta which would
seem to sanction the specific enforcement of conditions, analogous
to the specific performance of contracts. It was first suggested
in Baker v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 74 that the grantor of a right
of way might "bring his bill for specific performance" of a condition concerning fencing, or recover damages for the breach,
"or he may, proceed to build the fences and compel the company
to pay therefor."

In Hubbard v. K. C., etc. R. R. Co.,7

the plain-

tiff conveyed a right of way by an instrument which stipulated for
a "depot to be located" on the land. The court treated this as a
condition subsequent, and held that the plaintiff could not recover
damages for a wrongful entry, but added that he might have
"claimed the damages resulting from their appropriation of his
land under false pretenses," and that he had "his remedy by a
proceeding in equity for specific performance." 76 In Knight v.
K. C., etc. Ry.,77 the grant of a right of way was on condition
71. Langdell, Summary of Contracts (2d ed.) § 112.
72. Walker v. Engler (1860) 30 Mo. 130; Powers Shoe Co. v. Odd
Fellows Hall Co. (1908) 133 Mo. App. 229.
73. Gannett v. Albree (1869) 103 Mass. 373.
74. (1874) 57 Mo. 265.
75. (1876) 63 Mo. 68.
76. In Aiken v. Albany, Vermont and Canada Rt. R. Co. (1857)
26 Barb. (N. Y.) 2-89, specific performance was actually given in a very
similar case.
77. (1879) 70 Mo. 231. In Alexander v. Alexander (1900) 156
Mo. 413, the conception of a condition as creating an obligation led
to an improper result. Vide post, p. 17.
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subsequent, which constituted in the language of the court "a
matter of contract between the parties." But, in spite of these
dicta, it is conceived that a grantee has not, by reason of his
acceptance alone, any obligation to perform a condition, and
that the true doctrine was stated in Clarke v. Inhabitants of
Brookfield,78 where the court said that "no personal obligation
is imposed on, the grantee. It is not as it might have been, a
covenant as well as a condition. The trustees were not bound
to build on these lots."7° It follows that there should be no
specific enforcement of a condition! in equity,8 0 though of course
a contract growing out of the transaction might be enforced
specifically.
The "condition" in Weinreich v. Weinreich,8' that. the grantee

pay money to a third person, seems to have been regarded as
both a condition and a trust, the latter being specifically enforcible; but it was not so held.
7.

Who May Take Advantage Of Breach Of Condition.

The common law rule that a right of entry for condition
broken can be reserved only to the grantor and his heirs,8 2 has
frequently been stated by the Missouri court.83 If the condition
78.
79.

(1884) 81 Mo. 503.
See Jackson v. Florence (1819)

16 Johns. (N. Y.) 47; Palmer

v. Plank-Road Co. (1854) 11 N. Y. 376, 389; Close v. Burlington Ry.
(1884) 64 Iowa 149.
The doctrine of the text has nothing to do with the enforcement
of a public use for which land may have been dedicated. Goode v.
St. Louis (1892) 113 Mo. 257. In Helton v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co.
(1887) 25 Mo. App. 322, it was suggested that the grantor might
restrain the grantee's use of the premises until the condition should
be performed; but this seems to have been based on a misconception
of Evans v. Mo. etc. Ry. Co. (1877) 64 Mo. 453.
80. There is some recognition of this in Jones v. St. Louis etc.
Ry. Co. (1883) 79 Mo. 92. Apparently, no attempt has been made in
Missouri to have a condition specifically enforced.
81. (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364.
82. Tiffany, Real Property, § 75. But the proposition in the text
does not prevent the creation of a condition which involves the
grantee's doing something for a stranger, as paying money to him,
Pierce v. Lee (1906) 197 Mo. 480; or supporting him, Alexander v.
Alexander (1900) 156 Mo. 413.
83. Kennett v. Plummer (1859) 28 Mo. 142; Knight v. K. C. etc.
R. R. Co. (1879) 70 Mo. 231; Jones v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. (188.3)
79 Mo. 92.
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is in a devise, the right of re-entry is really reserved to the
testator's 'heirs.8 4 If it is desired that a stranger shall benefit
by the breach of a condition, the result may be accomplished by
means of a conditional limitation operating under the statute of
uses.85 But a stranger cannot take advantage of a condition.
In Kennett v. Plummer, 6 the court did not decide whether the
grant was on condition or in trust, but held that in either event
a trespasser could take no advantage of it. In Knight v. K. C.,
etc. R. R.,5 7 it was held that as against every one except the
grantor the grantee's right of way continued unaffected by breach
of the condition. In Ellis v. Kyger,s s the court held that a widow
had no dower in lands which her husband had conveyed, she
joining in the conveyance, even after breach of a condition subsequent, prior to entry by -her husband.
Nor could the grantor, at common law, assign his right of
entry for breach of an express condition,8 9 the common-law
principle being that "nothing in action, entry or re-entry can be
granted over." 90 An attempted assignment by the grantor has
the effect of destroying the right of re-entry entirely. 1 By the
statute of Henry VIII,92 an assignee of the reversion was per-

mitted to take advantage of a condition attached to an estate for
life or years. This statute is generally conceived to exist in the
United States as a part of the common law.9 3

It must so exist

95
in Missouri, 94 for in Metropolitan Land Company v. Manning,

84.
85.

Such was the condition in Pierce v. Lee (1906) 197 Mo. 480.
Vide ante, p. 7.

86.

(1859)

28 Mo. 142.

87.

(1879)

70 Mo. 231.

88.

(1886)

90 Mo. 600.

89. The right of entry for breach of a condition in law Is assignable. 2 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 954.
90. Litt., § 347; Tiffany, Real Property, § 75; Reeves, Real Property, § 721.
91. Rice v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co. (1866) 12 Allen (Mass.)
141; Tinkham v. Erie Ry. Co. (1866) 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 393.
92. (1540) 32 Henry VIII, c. 34.
93. Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 29; Stockbridge Iron Co.
v. Cone Iron Works (1869) 102 Mass. 80, in which the court said that
the statute refers "only to conditions to do anything incident to the
reversion, and not to conditions to do or not to do collateral acts."
94. It was probably included in the adoption of "appropriate
statutes of the British Parliament" in 1816. 1 Mo. Terr. Laws, p.
436.
95. (1902) 98 Mo. App. 248. The cases cited by the court, Allen
v. Kennedy (1886) 91 Mo. 324, and Hendrix v. Dickson (1896) 69 Mo.
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the lessor's assignee was permitted to enforce a forfeiture for
breach of condition, though the question of assignment was not
well considered. 9 6
It was contended in Ellis v. Kyger, 97 that the statute s
authorizing the conveyance "of lands, or of any estate or interest
therein" had abrogated the rule that a right of entry for condition broken, annexed to a fee simple, cannot be assigned; but
the court did not consider the point. In Moore v. Wingate,9
the assignment by the grantor was made after entry for breach,
but the court seemed to approve the contention that the right
could not be assigned, 100 though the statute was not considered.
Until a decision to the contrary, it cannot safely be assumed that
the statute applies to rights of re-entry, though its terms are
broad enough to include them.
Nor can a right of entry for condition broken be devised, 10 1
and a residuary devise should not be construed to include it.102
This may, however, have been changed by the statute as to wills,1 0 3
which permits a man to devise "all his estate, real, personal and
mixed, and all interest therein," and a woman to devise "her
land, tenements or any descendible interests therein."
App. 197, were both cases of covenants which will of course pass to an
assignee.
96.

In Farwell v. Easton (1876)

63 Mo. 446, the lessor had as-

signed and taken a re-assignment, and he was permitted to claim a
forfeiture.
97. (1886)

98.

90 Mo. 600.

Now Revised Statutes 1909, § 2787.

This statute seems to

have been enacted in its present form in 1866. Revised Statutes 1866,
c. 109, § 1. It has been held to permit the conveyance of a contingent
remainder. Godman v. Simmons (1892) 113 Mo. 12,2; Sikemeier v.
Galvin (1894) 124 Mo. 367. In Brown v. Fulkerson (1894) 125 Mo.
400, the court said that "all interests in real estate are vendible under
the laws of this state."
99. (1873) 53 Mo. 398.
100. Citing Nicoll v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. (1852) 12 Barb. (N. Y.)
460; and Warner v. Bennett (1863) 31 Conn. 468. See also Jones v.
St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. (1883) 79 Mo. 92. In McClellan v. St. Louis &
Han bal R. R. (1890) 103 Mo. 295, the grantor's assignee was not
permitted to recover, but the question was not discussed.
101. Southard v. Central R. R. Co. (1856) 26 N. J. L. 13; Upington
v. Corrigan (1896) 151 N. Y. 143.
102. Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish (1838) 21 Pick. 215 is contra. But see Gray, Cases on Property (2d ed.), Vol. VI, p. 6, note.
103. Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 535 and 536.
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It follows from the non-assignability of rights of re-entry
that they cannot be apportioned by the grantor. Thus if a condition be annexed to a term for years the grant of the reversion
of a part passes no right of re-entry and the condition is destroyed
as to the whole, for it was entire; 104 but if the reversion be
granted to one for life, remainder in fee to another, both the
life tenant and the remainderman may take advantage of a
breach, each during the period of his possessing the land. Apportionment may occur by act of law. If one having a right of
re-entry dies, either before or after breach of condition, the
right passes to his heirs, each of whom may enforce a forfeiture
of his proportional part. 10 5 Whether, prior to entry, there may
be a partition among the 'heirs, seems very, doubtful; the statute 106 authorizing the partition of lands held in joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, or coparcenary, does not seem to apply.
8.

Against Whom May Conditions Be Asserted.

The condition, once annexed, binds the land in spite of any
alienation by the grantee. Where a condition is entire, its breach
as to any part of the conveyed premises is a breach as to all,
and will justify an entry on all. Thus, if A convey to B on
condition and B convey a portion to C and a portion to D, a
breach by C as to his portion will entitle A to enter on the
whole. 10 7 The continuance of the condition does not depend
on the passing of covenants. In Ruddick v. St. Lou4., etc. Ry.
Co., 0 8 the grant was on condition subsequent that the grantee
furnish passes to the grantor and the grantee covenanted to
furnish them. The covenant did not run with the land because
"foreign to, independent of and not in any manner connected
104. Tinkham v. Erie Ry. Co. (1866) 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 393.
105. In Cruger v. McLaury (1869) 41 N. Y. 219, the court permitted an heir to maintain ejectment for his undivided portion. The
question might have arisen in Pierce v. Lee (1906) 197 Mo. 480, but
for the waiver.
106. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2559. This statute has been held
to permit the partition of a contingent remainder. Preston v. Brant
(1888) 96 Mo. 552,.
107. Geer v. Zinc Company (1907)

108.

(1893) 116 Mo. 25.

126 Mo. App. 173.
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But the court held that "the defendant as the suc-

cessor by purchase to the grantee, took subject to all the conditions and is bound thereby as if it were the original grantee."
In Alexander v. Alexander," ° a testator devised lands to
his son, "provided he shall well and faithfully care for and
support his mother as long as she shall live." The mother outlived the son and did not at any time seek provision from him.
In a suit to construe the will, the court held that the condition
was subsequent and that the land passed to the son's heirs freed
of it. The court confused the condition in the devise with a
contractual obligation and found that the condition was "personal" to the devisee. An obligation may be personal but a condition is attached to land and is never personal in any other sense

than that it may be such that only one person can perform it.
The mother's support was to continue during her life; her condition might have changed so that she would need it; and for
the son's failure to provide it, there should have been a forfeiture. 1"' In Messersmith v. Messersnith,"1 2 the facts of which
were very similar to those of Alexander v. Alexander, it was conceded that the condition survived the grantee.
In Wood v. Ogden,'13 the court felt bound by Alexander v.
Alexander, but followed it reluctantly. The provision for the
devisee's supporting his mother was stated as the "consideration" of the devise, not as the "condition" of it. The mother,
as plaintiff, sought a personal judgment against the son's widow,
and to have her right to support enforced as a charge on the
1 14
land. But since the provision was construed as a condition,
109. Ace. Dickey v. K. C. etc. Ry. Co. (1894) 122 Mo. 223.
110. (1900) 156 Mo. 413.
111. Some of the testator's heirs had attempted to pass their
interest to others of them, who had entered. The assignment passed
nothing, but the assignees had a right of entry by their own Inheritance to a portion of the land.
Alexander v. Alexander is not to be explained on the ground that
the condition had been waived-it was a breach which continued as
long as there was a failure to provide. Only the heirs who had the
right of entry could waive breaches, and their waiver, if there was
any, did not preclude entry for future breaches. Farwell v. Easton
(1876) 63 Mo. 446.
112. (1856) 22 Mo. 369.
113. (1906) 121 Mo. App. 628.

114.

But cf. Anderson v. Gaines (1900) 156 Mo. 664.
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it is submitted that she was not entitled to either, and that
though the decision is correct, it is no authority for saying that
the condition, did not bind the land in the hands of the son's
widow and his heirs.
9.

Remedies For Breach Of Condition.

Because of the consequences of a breach, the courts are
reluctant to find that the condition has been broken, and a substantial performance Of a condition is sufficient. 1 5 If the condition involves the doing of some act by the grantee and no
time limit is set, the grantee should have "his whole lifetime for
performance, except when a prompt performance is'necessary
to give to the grantor or other beneficiary the whole benefit contemplated to be secured to him, or where its immediate fruition
formed his motive" 116 for the conveyance, in which case only
a reasonable time is allowed.1 17 If the condition is that rent
be paid to the grantor by the grantee, the former must make
demand in order to enforce a forfeiture for a breach. The
common law requires such a demand to be made according to
the strictest rules-on the day the rent falls due, at a convenient hour, at a notorious place on the premises and for the
exact sum due.'1 5 It seems that this demand must still be made
to end a term for years, apart from statutory procedure." 9
115. Morrill v. Wabash Ry. (1888) 96 Mo. 174. See Reeves, Real
Property, § 718. Cf. Smith v. Eagle Coal & Mercantile Co. (1913) 170
Mo. App. 27.
116. Tiffany, Real Property, § 71.
117. Ellis v. Kyger (1886) 90 Mo. 600. In Butler v. Manny (1873)
52 Mo. 497, it was held that no time being fixed for the payment of
taxes to which the lessee was bound by covenant, they should be paid
as they became due. See also Metropolitan Land Co. v. Manning (1902)
98 Mo. App. 248.
118. McGlynn v. Moore (1864) 25 Cal. 384.
Tiffany, Real Property, § 71; Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 31. In Illingworth v.
Miltenberger (1847) 11 Mo. 80, it was held that a tender before the rent
was due would not prevent a forfeiture.
119. Metropolitan Land Co. v. Manning (1902) 98 Mo. App. 248;
Taylor, Landlord and Tenant (9th ed.) § 493. The statutes have

abolished the technical requirements of the common law as to demand, Revised Statutes 1909, § 7908, and conferred on the landlord a
right to dispossess any tenant for non-payment of rent. Revised
Statutes 1909, § 7903.
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It is one of the essential differences between a limitation
and a condition annexed to an estate of freehold that the happening or breach of the condition does not ipso facto determine
the estate granted. The grantor must signify his intention to
insist upon the condition by some unmistakable act, whereas "a
limitation determines an estate upon the happening of the event
itself, without the necessity of doing any act to regain the
estate." 120 It was suggested in Adams v. Lindell 121 that a
condition might be so worded that a breach would ipso facto
122
determine the estate; but as to freeholds this cannot be true.
At common law the grantor's election must be made "by entry
or some act equivalent to it." 123 As stated in Adams v. Lindell,' 21 "the entry was necessary to defeat the livery made on
the creation of the original estate," and only entry was of equal
solemnity with livery. It followed that terms for years, since
they did not have their origin in livery of seisin but could be
created by parol agreement plus entry at common law, could
be ended without ceremony, a "claim" being sufficient.' 24 Entry
by the grantor or lessor must be with the intent to enforce a
forfeiture.' 25 No previous notice need be given to the grantee
or lessee.' 26 If the grantee has never taken possession, no entry
by the grantor is necessary. In O'Brien v. Wagner, 27 the grantor
possessed at the time of the breach, and it was held that the
estate revested at once. But the presumption to that effect is
rebuttable.
120.

2 Devlin, Deeds

Hoselton ( 901)

(2d

ed.)

§ 974, quoted

in Hoselton v.

166 Mo. 182.

121. (L878) 5 Mo. App. 197, 72 Mo. 198.
122. See Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, §§ 30, 62.
123. 1llis v. Kyger (1886) 90 Mo. 600.
124. 1-1 Illingworth v. Miltenbergcr (1847) 11 Mo. 80, the forfeiture
was declar,. d by indorsement on the lease. It is competent for the
parties to otipulate the manner in which a lessor must indicate his
intention to enforce a forfeiture. Graham v. Carondelet (1862) 33 Mo.
262.
125. 2 'Vashburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 958.
126. Geer v. Zinc Co. (1907) 126 Mo. App. 173.
127. (1837) 94 Mo. 93. In Moore v. Wingate (1873) 53 Mo. 398,
the statement that "the fee remained in the grantor" as a result of
his continued possession, can only be correct if the condition was
precedent. Of course, if the grantor by his possession causes a breach,
he can take no advantage of it.
3
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The effect of entry is to defeat the grant and the grantor
is thereafter "in as of 'his original estate as if he had never
129
parted with it," 128 and he may convey an indefeasible title.
An entry on part of the land is sufficient to enforce a forfeiture
of the whole. In Ruddick v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co.,l1o the court
said, "if several parcels of land are conveyed upon condition by
the same deed, or are embraced in the same mortgage and are
all situate in the same county, an entry upon one in the name of
the whole will be sufficient to enforce the condition as to all of
the parcels." After entry by the grantor, the widow has
dower.' 3 1 Since the condition binds the estate in the hands of
any assignee, the entry by the grantor will defeat any incumbrance which the grantee may have put on the land. While a
right of re-entry need not be expressly reserved,' 3 2 numerous
cases have drawn a distinction, where it was so reserved, in the
grantor's enforcement of his remedy. In Avery v. K. C. &
Southern R. R. Co., 13 3 the early railroad cases denying the grantor
a right to insist on a forfeiture were distinguished on the ground
that no provision for forfeiture was expressed, though the conveyances were admitted to be on condition. In Baker v. C. R. I.
& P. R. R., 134 the road was built under a license which was
given on condition,' 3 5 and the court refused to permit the grantor

to eject the company after breach. In Hubbard v. K. C., etc. R.
R., 136 the action was for damages, but the court said ejectment
128. Tiffany, Real Property, § 76.
129. Moore v. Wingate (1873) 53 Mo. 398. But to maintain
trespass, the grantor must not only have entered but also have
acquired a possession. Metropolitan Land Co. v. Manning (1902) 98
Mo. App. 248.
130. (1893) 116 Mo. 25. It would seem that the several parcels
need not be located in the same county.
131. Ellis v. Kyger (1886) 90 Mo. 600.
132. Ruddick v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. (1893) 116 Mo. 25. See
ante, p. 6.
133. (1892) 113 Mo. 561.
134. (1874) 57 Mo. 265.
135. The deed of relinquishment was handed to the grantee's
agent in escrow. It was treated as no delivery by the court, but it
would seem that a delivery in escrow can no more be made to an
agent of the grantee than to the grantee himself. 3 Washburn, Real
Property (6th ed.) § 2176; Hubbard v. Greeley (1892) 84 Me. 340.
It is not clear whether the court's decision is based on the grant or on
a previous license.
136. (1876) 63 Mo. 68.
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would not lie for breach of condition subsequent. In McClellan
v. St. Louis & Hanibal R. R., 13 7 the grantor's assignee sought
to enforce a condition subsequent by ejectment, there being no
express reservation of a right of re-entry. The court denied
the relief without a consideration of an assignee's rights, and
said that the grantor himself "could not have maintained ejectment with or without a decree setting aside this deed." 138 This
dictum is repeated in unintelligible form in Ruddick v. St. Louis,
etc. Ry. Co.' s ° But after the decision in Avery v. K. C. & Southern R. R. Co.,133 it seems clear that the grantor may always have
ejectment after breach, 140 and unless a special rule is to be adopted
for railroad cases, the inclusion of a provision for re-entry is
14
not essential. 1
Entry need not precede the grantor's suit in ejectment.
Whether this is based on the confession of entry involved in
the action, or on the fact that livery of seisin being practically
obsolete, the solemnity of entry is unnecessary, the Missouri
courts have not worked out.1 42 In cases of leases for years, the
43
forfeiture may be enforced by an action of unlawful detainer.'
137. (1890) 103 Mo. 295.
138. Citing Baker v. C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (1874) 57 Mo. 265;
Bradley v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1886) 91 Mo. 493; Provolt v. C. R. I. &
P. R. R. Co. (1874) 57 Mo. 256. The two latter cases are no authority
for the proposition.
139. (1893) 116 Mo. 25. See also Helton v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co.
(1887) 25 Mo. App. 322.
140. It would seem that the mere filing of an ejectment suit
should be sufficient expression of the grantor's intention and should
revest the estate in him if there has been a breach. It was held in
Jones v. Carter (1846) 15 M. & W. 718, that a term was ended where
the ejectment suit had proceeded to the consent rule. In Avery v.
K. C. & So. R. R. Co. (1892) 113 Mo. 561, the court said "the commencement of the suit was all that the law required." But in Nagel
v. League (1897) 70 Mo. App. 487, it was held that after filing a suit
to enforce a forfeiture, the landlord's second suit under the landlord's
summons act in which the defendant was recognized as tenant, waived
the breach and the previous declaration of forfeiture. It is difficult
to support this case, if the filing of the first suit ended the term.
141. Kirk v. Mattier (1897) 140 Mo. 23; Brooks v. Gain (1905)
192 Mo. 228, 196 Mo. 357.
142. It may be due to the statute, Revised Statutes 1909, § 2382,
as suggested in Ellis v. Kyger (1886) 90 Mo. 600. See Tiffany, Real
Property, § 74.
,143. Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 7657, 7689; Walker v. Engler
(1860) 30 Mo. 130; Farwell v. Easton (1876) 63 Mo. 446; Baxter v.
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The statutory action of unlawful detainer may, apparently, be
availed of where the grant is of a freehold estate, 144 but advantage has rarely, if ever, been taken of it in such cases.
After breach of condition, the grantor is not entitled to
equity's aid to enforce a forfeiture, nor can he have the deed
cancelled or set aside. The deed was an effectual instrument
to pass a title and since the grantor has adequate remedies
at law there is no reason for equity's taking jurisdiction. In
Messersrnith v. Messersmith,14 5 the court refused to cancel the
deed on the ground that "equity never lends its aid to enforce
a forfeiture." Reynolds v. Reynolds,' 46 involved a conveyance
by parents by warranty deed to their son who immediately reconveyed by deed of trust conditioned on his support of the
parents during their lives. The son failed to support the parents
who remained in possession of the farm conveyed. In a suit to
set aside the warranty deed, the court held it to be a conveyance on condition subsequent, and decreed a cancellation of the
warranty deed. But it is submitted that if the parents' conveyance is to be taken to have been on condition subsequent,
the breach operated to revest their title, they being already in
possession, and that the only relief in equity was for a removal
of the cloud which the outstanding deed created. It seems proper
that the grantor may after entry maintain a bill to remove a
cloud on his title, 147 if the forfeiture is effected by entry and
the outstanding deed is made the basis of the assertion of a
Heimann (1908) 134 Mo. App. 260.

not to

The statute has been interpreted

require demand where the possession began rightfully. Anderson v. McClure (1894) 57 Mo. App. 93. In Powers Shoe Co. v. Odd
Fellows Hall Co. (1908) 133 Mo. App. 229, the court enjoined the
prosecution of the unlawful detainer suit.
144. Revised Statutes 1909, § 7658.
145. (1856) 22 Mo. 369. In Anderson v. Gaines (1900) 156 Mo.
664, the court refused to set aside the deed, but it does not clearly
appear that the conveyance was on condition. In Smith v. Eagle Coal
& Mercantile Co. (19,13) 170 Mo. App. 27, the action to have a lease
adjudged forfeited failed because there had been no breach. Cf.
Lackland v. Walker (Mo., 1914) 169 S. W. 275.
146. (1910) 234 Mo. 144.
147. Moore v. Wingate (1873) 53 Mo. 398; Birmingham v. Lesan
(1885) 77 Me. 494. In Moberly v. Trenton (1904) 181. Mo. 637, the

petition seems to have been improperly framed for the removal of
the cloud.
App. 27.

Cf. Smith v. Eagle Coal & Mercantile Co. (1913)

170 Mo.
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hostile interest. The grantor should not be entitled to a reconveyance, and the stipulation for it in Adams v. Lindell 148
was merely nugatory unless it could be treated as a covenant
by the grantee. The existence of a right of re-entry does not
deprive equity of its jurisdiction to restrain a breach of covenant.1 9
Since the condition in itself involves no contractual obligation, 110 the grantor should not be allowed to maintain an action
for damages for breach.1 51
The grantor's right to enforce a forfeiture for condition
broken may be barred by the statute of limitations, 15 2 and it is
conceivable that he may be estopped from enforcing a forfeiture,
though most of the cases of so-called estoppel are really cases
of waiver. 155
10.

Waiver And License.

Any act by the grantor, subsequent to a breach and done
with a knowledge of the breach, which affirms the continued
existence of the estate in the grantee, is a waiver of the breach. 15 4
Because of the law's aversion to the forfeiture, it is liberal in
finding a waiver and "slight acts are deemed sufficient for this
purpose." 155 The acceptance of rent, any portion of which
became due after the breach, amounts to a waiver, if the breach
was known to have occurred, 150 and a protest that the accept148.

(1880)

5 Mo. App. 197, 72 Mo. 198.

149. Godfrey v. Black (1888) 39 Kan. 193. In Baker v. St. Louis
(1879) 7 Mo. App. 429, 75 Mo. 671, the covenant for a reconveyance
was specifically enforced, entry being unnecessary. Cf. Sease v. Cleveland Foundry Co. (1897) 141 Mo. 488.
150. Vide ante, p. 12.
151. Ruddick v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. (1893) 116 Mo. 33. But cf.
Hubbard v. K. C. etc. R. R. Co. (1876) 63 Mo. 68.
152. Hoke v. Central Township Farmers' Club (1905) 194 Mo.
576; Pierce v. Lee (1906) 197 Mo. 480.
153. Garnhart v. Finney (1867) 40 Mo. 449; Bredell v. Westminster College (1912) 242 Mo. 317.
154. Garnhart v. Finney (1867) 40 Mo. 449.
155. After entry or effectual declaration of a forfeiture, it would
seem that a waiver by the grantor cannot revest the estate in the
grantee. But see Nagel v. League (1897) 70 Mo. App. 487.
156. Walker v. Engler (1860) 30 Mo. 130; Trauerman v. Lipplncott (1889) 39 Mo. App. 478.
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ance is not a waiver is unavailing. 157 But the waiver extends
only to past breaches-it is the breach, and not the condition
which is waived, though there may be no difference where the
condition is such that a single breach will exhaust it. A waiver
of a continuous breach during its continuance does not prevent
a forfeiture; thus, in Farwell v. Easton,158 it was held that the
"forbidden use was a continuing cause of forfeiture" of which
the lessor might avail himself after receipt of rent with knowledge of the user. In Tower v. Compton Hill Improvement Co.,'1

9

the grant was on condition and the grantor imposed servitudes
on adjacent premises which he owned. After breach of the
condition, the grantee sought to restrain the grantor's violation
of the restrictions placed on the adjacent premises, but failed
because of his own wrong. Later, more than ten years after
the breach, the executors (also devisees) of the grantor sought
to enter for condition broken, but the court thought the provisions of the deed abrogated and the action barred by the statute. 0 0
But it is difficult to see how the waiver of the past breaches destoyed the condition.
It would seem that mere non-action by a grantor or lessor cannot amount to awaiver, though if continued for the statutory period
the right of entry may be barred by the statute of limitations.'"
But if this non-action is under the circumstances calculated to
induce the grantee or lessee to expend money on the premises
in the reasonable belief that*the grantor or lessor does not intend to take advantage of the condition, and if the grantee or
lessee does actually spend such money and this fact is known
to the grantor or lessor who still fails to act, then the grantor
or lessor may be taken to have waived his right to a forfeiture.' 62
157. Davenport v. The Queen (1877)
158. (1876) 63 Mo. 446.
159.

160.

3 'App. Cases 115.

(1905) 192 Mo. 379.

It should be noticed that the plaintiffs had no right to enter

because they did not sue as 'heirs.
161. Hoke v. Central Township Farmers' Club (1905) 194 Mo.
576. In this case the court quoted with apparent approval a statement of the Kentucky court in Kenner v. American Contract Co. (1872)
9 Bush 210, that "the waiver of a forfeiture may be inferred by reason
of the failure of the party entitled to the estate to re-enter or assert
some claim in a reasonable time."
162. Powers Shoe Co. v. Odd Fellows Hall Co. (1908) 133 Mo.
App. 229; Bredell v. Westminster College (1912) 242 Mo. 317.
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This latter waiver is really an estoppel. In Johnson v. Douglass,163
a lessor was entitled to exact a forfeiture for non-payment of
rent, and when he demanded the payment the tenant said he
would credit the amount of the rent on the lessor's note which he
held; to which the lessor made no objection. The court held
this amounted to a waiver by the lessor-it could not have been
an estoppel for it does not appear that the tenant had changed
his position; but in a true case of waiver, this is unnecessary.
Where a lease is on condition that the lessee and his assigns
shall not assign without license, it was early held in Dumpor's
Case,16 4 that an assignment with license destroyed the condition. 165
This rule has been much criticised, 166 but its authority is generally recognized. 167 In Tennessee Marine & Insurance Co. v.
Scott,'65 the court said that "Dumpor's Case, though much criticised by eminent judges, is still adhered to as law," but it was
held that it did not apply to a condition in an insurance contract. Dougherty v. Matthews,169 was a suit by a lessor against
his lessee's assignee for rent. The lease was conditioned on nonassignment by the lessee without license, but it is not shown that
the condition forbade assignment by the lessee's assigns. The
lessee assigned to the defendant, apparently without license, and
the defendant procured the plaintiff's, consent to a second assignment upon his undertaking responsibility for the rent. It was
held that the defendant's undertaking was a mere nudum pactum,
but the court did not decide that the condition was destroyed by
163. (1880) 73 Mo. 168.
164. (1603) 4 Co. 119b.
165. But an action may still be maintained on the covenant if
there is one. Cf. Gannett v. Albree (1869) 103 Mass. 372; Dakin v.
Williams (1839) 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 201.
166. See 7 American Law Review 616; 1 Smith, Leading Cases
(9th ed.) 135.
167. Brummell v. Macpherson (1807) 14 Ves. 173. See 23 Harvard
Law Review 630. In Reid v. Brewing Co. (1898) 88 Md. 234, the
doctrine was extended to covenants. But see 12 Harvard Law Review
272.
168. (1851) 14 Mo. 46. In 7 American Law Review 635, it is
said that the Missouri court repeated the dictum of Tennessee Marine
& Fire Insurance Co. v. Scott in McGlynn v. Moore for which the citation is given as 25 Mo. 384. But there is no such case in the Missouri
reports and the reference must be to McGlynn v. Moore (1864) 25
Cal. 384.
169. (1865) 35 Mo. 520.
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the first assignment to which, being without license, Dum por's
Case did not apply. 170 ]In Fa'well v. Easton,,1 7' it was in effect
held that a tolerance of past breaches of a condition against certain use of the premises was not a license and (lid not destroy
the condition. In Crouch v. Wabash, etc. Ry. Co., 17 2 there may
have been one license to assign, but it was unnecessary to decide
whether the condition survived it, for if it did, the breach had
been, waived. These cases leave in doubt the authority of
Duinpor's Case in Missouri. If it is law, it probably does not
apply unless the condition is against assignment 173 by the lessee
and his assigns after Dougherty v. Matthews, and it applies only
to conditions against ass!gnment. The rule of Dumpor's Case
should be avoided by an insertion in a lease of a provision that
a license is not to have the effect of destroying the condition,
174
or by a stipulation to this effect in the license actually given.
11.

Equitable Relief Against Forfeiture.

The well-defined jurisdiction of equity to relieve against
forfeitures may be exercised in favor of a grantee whose estate
is subject to defeasance by the grantor, if a proper case for
equitable relief is presented. It was first suggested, by way of
dictum in Messersmith v. Messersmith,7 5 where the condition
was that the grantee support the grantor, that equity would compel the grantor to accept just compensation in lieu of a forfeiture.
The prayer in Graham v. Carondelet 176 was for relief against a
forfeiture declared, but the court found that the declaration was
inoperative and it was therefore unnecessary to give relief. In
170. The first headnote to Dougherty v. Matthews is therefore
misleading and has probably caused the numerous citations of the
case as following Dumpor's Case. See Tiffany, Real Property, § 72.
171. (1876) 63 Mo. 446.
172. (1886) 22 Mo. App. 315.
173. It would seem that Dumpor's Case Is not to be applied to a
condition against sub-letting. Doe d. Boscawen v. Bliss (1813) 4
Taunt. 735.
174. Kew v. Trainor (1894) 150 Ill. 150.
175. (1856) 22 Mo. 369. The court also suggested that the equitable defense might be set up :in an action at law for possession. Such
a defense seems to have been allowed in Knight v. Orchard (1901) 92
Mo. App. 466. Cf. Tetley v. McElmurry (1906) 201 Mo. 382.
176. (1862) 33 Mo. 262.
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Avery v. K. C. & So. R. R. Co., 17 7 the condition was that rent
be paid and the dictum of the court was that the tenant "might
have paid the rent and been relieved from the forfeiture." In
Powers Shoe Co. v. Odd Fellows Hall Co., 175 a lessee sought to

enjoin the lessor's prosecution of an unlawful detainer suit and
to have the lessor's declaration of a forfeiture set aside as a
cloud on the leasehold. The court seems to have thought that
the lessor was guilty of fraud and laches which deprived him
of his right to enforce a forfeiture and the relief was granted.
But there is a clear dictum that forfeiture occasioned by an
assignment without the lessor's consent would not be relieved
against. In Kansas City, etc. Ry. Co. v. Young," 79 the court
restrained a grantor's interference with a right of way, given
on condition that a stun of money be paid before actual construction of the railroad should be commenced, though such
sum was not paid. But in Orr v. Zimmerman,180 there is a
dictum that "courts of equity will not interfere where the exaction is made for the protection of the vendor, and under circumstances where a strictly legal right is fairly claimed."
The doctrine of the Missouri cases seems to be that the
grantor's enforcement of his legal right to a forfeiture will not
be restrained unless he is proceeding unconscionably, or unless the
money compensation offered is adequate redress for the breach
8
and the grantor's damage is ascertainable.1 '
12. Statutory Conditions.
The most important question concerning statutory conditions
arises in connection with the statutory dedication of land to
public uses. The filing of a plat of a city, town, village or
addition is given the effect of vesting "the fee of such parcels
of land as are therein named, described or intended for public
177.
178.
Mo. 72.

(1892)
(1908)

113 Mo. 561.
133 Mo. App. 229.

Cf. Orr v. Zimmerman (1876)

63

179. (1912) 167 Mo. App. 524. Cf. Tetley v. McElmurry (1906)
201 Mo. 382.
180. (1876) 63 Mo. 72.
181. In Brooks v. Gaffin (1905) 192 Mo. 228, 255, the damage was
not ascertainable, hence the court's dictum that the grantee had "no
right to ask any court to relieve him of his own breach of his voluntary contract."
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uses in such city, town or village in trust and for the uses
therein named, expressed c r intended, and for no other use or
purpose." 182 Does this statute confer an absolute fee on the
municipality? 183 Or does some interest or possibility of interest remain in the dedicator? If it were a common law dedication, the public would get but an easement; but this statute purports to pass the fee. Suppose the public use is abandoned or
becomes impossible-may the dedicator or his heirs re-enter?
The question seems to have squarely arisen only in Gaskins
v. Williams,5 4 where the statutory dedication. was "for courthouse purposes" and such -use having become "practically" impossible, the court held that the title reverted to the dedicator's
heirs. The court cited Campbell v. Kansas City 1s5 and Goode v.
St. Louis,'8 6 but both of these cases involved common law dedications. If the title reverts, has the dedicator a right of entry for
condition broken, or a possibility of reverter? If the first, his
right cannot be assigned; 17 if the second, it can be assigned.
The court did not attempt to answer the question, if indeed it
was considered, in Gaskins v. Williams, but said that the municipality does not have "an absolute, unqualified ownership." 188
The possible remoteness of the dedicator's interest is a practical
consideration.
Statutory dedication must be considered also in connection
with statutory vacation of public lands, 8 9 the effect of which
is that if the land vacated "be a, street or alley,

.

.

.

all

title thereto shall vest in the person owning the property on each
side thereof in equal proportions." If this deprives the dedicator
182. Revised Statutes 1835, p. 599. Now Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 10294.
183. The dictum in Snoddy v. Bolen (1894) 122 Mo. 479, is that

while the statute "vests the fee in the street in the city, town, village

or county, still it is held in trust for street purposes and for no other
use or purpose. Every other beneficial use is in the lot owners, and
this interest of the lot owner will pass by a conveyance of the lot."
What other beneficial use is -there? If the fee passes, what is the
nature of the dedicator's interest?
184. (1911) 235 Mo. 563. Cf. Robinson v. Korns (1913) 250 Mo.
663.
185. (1890) 102 Mo. 326.
186. (1892) 113 Mo. 257.
187. Vide ante, p. 14.
188. See Kales, Future Interests In Illinois, § 2 et seq.
189. Revised Statutes 1909, § 9502. Originally enacted In 1877.
Laws of 1877, p. 186.
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of any interest, it is unconstitutional for no compensation is
given. Can it be said that the dedicator's interest passes to his
grantees? If so, it is not a right of entry for condition broken.
There has been no decision on the effect of this statute, 19 0 and
until the theory of Gaskins v. Williams is worked out it will
be difficult to defend its constitutionality.' 9 '
Thomas v. Hunt 192 presented questions under both statutes,
but their determination was unnecessary to the decision. The
action was for possession of the east half of a street dedicated
by plat as the eastern boundary of an addition. The plaintiff
claimed as owner of an abutting lot on the east, which the
dedicators had owned at the time of the dedication of the street,
which had been vacated. The court was of the opinion that the
municipality. acquired but an easement, 93 and that the effect
of the vacation was to put the fee to the eastern half in the owner
of the lot abutting on the east. This latter result seems absurd,
except for the fact that the dedicator previously owned the lot
abutting on the east.
The other statutory conditions present little difficulty. Ever),
tenant holds subject to a statutory condition that the reserved
rent be paid promptly, 19 4 and tenants for terms not exceeding two
years hold subject to conditions against assignment and waste.19'5
The enforcement of these conditions is controlled entirely by
statute and is beyond the reach of the common law rules.
MANLEY

0.

HUDSON.1

9 6

190. Johnson v. Rasmus (1911) 237 Mo. 586, involved the abandonment of a public road under Revised Statutes 1909, § 10446; the public
had but an easement In that case.
191. This subject has been so fully discussed by Professor Kales
that it is unnecessary to treat It at greater length In this study. See
Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 3 et seq. In so far as It applies
to statutory dedications made prior to the enactment of the statute,
there can be little doubt as to its unconstitutionality if Gaskins v.
Williams is to be followed.
192. (1896) 134 Mo. 392.
193. It is possible that although the statute purports to pass a fee,
it passes but an easement. This view was taken of the early statutes
authorizing railroads to take the fee simple in condemnation proceedings.

Kellogg v. Malin (1872)

50 Mo. 496; Chouteau v. Mo. Pae. Ry.

Co. (1894) 122 Mo. 375.
194. Revised Statutes 1909, § 7903.
195. Revised Statutes 1909, § 7880.
196. The writer has been ably assisted by John M. Linger, Esq.,
in the preparation of this article.

